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¿Bajo qué circunstancias aparece la acción colectiva? ¿Cuáles son los factores que le 
dan mayores posibilidades de éxito a una acción colectiva? ¿En qué medida las comunidades 
pobres tienen capacidad para organizarse con el objetivo de mejorar sus condiciones de vida? 
Estas preguntas no son nuevas y se han hecho muchas investigaciones, pero usualmente para 
el mundo rural. La investigación sobre la acción colectiva en el mundo urbano parece estar 
más desarrollada en la ciencia política que en la economía. La pregunta fundamental se 
mantiene: ¿cómo se producen y se mantienen los bienes públicos en comunidades urbanas 
pobres? 
 
Este artículo presenta un conjunto de hipótesis sobre los determinantes de la acción 
colectiva.  La acción colectiva en barrios urbanos pobres enfrentan tres restricciones básicas: 
el problema olsoniano, el problema de Maslow y el problema de la exclusión. La parte 
empírica del artículo utiliza datos recolectados en  barrios marginales de Lima, Perú, en seis 




Under what circumstances does collective action arise? What contributes to the 
likelihood that a particular collective initiative will succeed? To what extent are poor 
communities capable of organizing themselves to improve their quality of life? These 
questions are not new, and economic researchers have studied a number of models in rural 
settings. Yet the research on collective action in urban areas seems to be more in the political 
sciences, and an economic model is still lacking. The fundamental question remains: How are 
public goods produced and maintained by poor urban communities? 
  
This paper presents a set of hypotheses on collective action determinants. Collective 
action in poor neighborhoods faces three key barriers to success: the Olsonian free-rider 
problem, the Maslowian problem, and the exclusion problem. The empirical portion of this 
paper uses data collected in poor urban and peri-urban areas of Lima, Peru, in six types of 
community organizations.  
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Under what circumstances does collective action arise? What contributes to the 
likelihood that a particular collective initiative will succeed? To what extent are poor 
communities capable of organizing themselves to improve their quality of life? These 
questions are not new, and economic researchers have proposed a number of models in rural 
settings (see for instance Berhanu, Pender, and Tesfay (2002), Cárdenas and Ostrom (2004), 
Krishna (2003), McCarthy, Dutilly-Diané, and Drabo (2002), Meinzen-Dick, Di Gregorio, and 
McCarthy (2004), Meinzen-Dick, Raj, and Gulati (2000), Place et al. (2002), and White and 
Runge (1994)). Yet the research on collective action in urban areas seems to be more in the 
political sciences (see for instance Walton (1997), Roberts and Portes (No date), and Joseph 
(1999)), and an economic model is still lacking. The fundamental question remains: How are 
public goods produced and maintained by poor urban communities? 
 
The applied portion of this paper uses data collected in urban and peri-urban areas of 
Lima, Peru in six types of community organizations.
2 Lima, like many Latin American cities, 
has seen decades of rapid urbanization; as a result many areas of the city lack infrastructure 
and basic goods such as water and sewage lines. Approximately 20% of Peruvians live in 
shantytowns, and of those around half live in Lima (Altamirano et al, 2003, p. 8). According 
to Ypeij (2000),  
                                                 
1   This research was carried out with the financial support of the J. William Fulbright Foreign 
Scholarship Board.  I am extremely grateful to Dr. Adolfo Figueroa of the Pontificia Universidad 
Católica del Perú for his patience and wisdom.  Many thanks to Adolfo Llacsa, Gina Alvarado 
Merino, Ramiro A. Málaga, and Sharon Almirall for their support. I also thank Ana María Gladys 
Arce Roca, Teresa Ramos García, Patricia Blanchard, Teófila Salazar de Villalobos, and all the 
community leaders who generously participated in interviews.  The findings and views presented 
in this working paper are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the position of the 
above-mentioned persons or institutions. 
2   Note that this is not an assessment of these organizations, which can be found in the work of 
researchers such as Blondet and Montero (1995), Gajate and Inurritegui (2003), and Ruggeri 
Luderchi (2001).    
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Lima’s inhabitants, especially the poor, are forced to develop their own answers to 
[the crisis of the 1980s and 1990s]. More and more they turn to each other for the 
solutions to their problems. Loyalty, solidarity, and communal work become 
increasingly important. Organized in grassroots organizations, they invade plots of 
land and construct houses and neighborhoods. In their struggle against the rising cost 
of living, poor women establish communal kitchens. (p. 19) 
 
The following paper attempts to define to what extent communal work has been a 
solution in poor urban areas, and what allows communal projects to succeed. In it I will show 
that collective action in such neighborhoods in fact faces three key barriers to success: the 
Olsonian free-rider problem, the Maslowian problem, and the exclusion problem. 
 
This paper is divided into six sections. Following this introduction, Section 2, using 
existing literature, presents several of the theoretical issues surrounding collective action.     
Section 3 offers a model to explain the factors affecting collective action. In Section 4 presents 
a first attempt at collecting data for an econometric application of this model, including 
qualitative observations. Section 5 includes a quantitative analysis of the data collected. 
Conclusions are given in Section 6. 
 
2. LITERATURE  REVIEW 
 
According to Marshall (1988), collective action is “action taken by a group (either 
directly or on its behalf through an organization) in pursuit of members’ perceived shared 
interests” (Meinzen-Dick, Di Gregorio, & McCarthy, 2004, p. 4). Walton’s 1997 study on 
urban collective action uses the following definition: “mobilized efforts of large number of the 
urban population to represent their interests, redress grievances, or change policies through 
claims on the larger society (c.f. Tilly, 1978)” (p. 5). This definition, while unnecessarily 
narrow, is useful to remind us that collective action can be for a political right, as opposed to a 
capital good. For this study, collective action is considered any action taken by a group in an 
attempt to obtain or maintain a public good (of economic or political importance). 
 
Early researchers argued that collective action is spontaneous: “in its most casual 
form, the traditional view is that private organizations and groups are ubiquitous, and that this 
ubiquity is due to a fundamental human propensity to form and join associations” (Olson, 
1971, p. 17), yet “any human action can be ascribed to an instinct or propensity for that kind 
of action, but this adds nothing to our knowledge” (ibid., p. 19). The overly optimistic view  
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Olson criticizes can be seen in some work on solidarity in Latin America (see, for instance, 
Forni, F & Sánchez, J. (1990)).   
 
Collective action, however, involves costs, both in time and money. Any group that 
attempts to obtain a public good must have the resources to cover these costs.  It must also 
have mechanisms in place to extract payment from its members. Mancur Olson’s (1971) 
classic book The Logic of Collective Action first proposed the free-rider problem, in which 
individuals will opt not to contribute to a common cause because they assume that other 
members of the group will cover the expense, allowing them to obtain the public good even 
though they did not contribute their fair share of the cost. As Olson argues, “though all of the 
members of the group therefore have a common interest in obtaining this collective benefit, 
they have no common interest in paying the cost of providing that collective good” (p. 21). 
Thus the question is not simply whether or not the individuals of a group collectively have 
enough resources to produce the public good, but whether or not they will in fact contribute to 
the group’s collective cause. 
 
According to Olson (1971), this problem will not arise in very small groups, because: 
There are members who would be better off if the collective good were provided, even 
if they had to pay the entire cost of providing it themselves, than they would be if it 
were not provided.  In such situations there is a presumption that the collective good 
will be provided. (p. 34) 
   
This will not be the case in large groups, where the benefit to one individual is much 
less likely to outweigh the entire cost; “the larger the group, the less it will further its common 
interests” (ibid., p. 36). Thus in asking how a group is able to obtain a public good for its 
members, an important question is how large the group is, particularly in relation to how much 
the good will cost. If enough members of the group are willing to cover more than their fair 
share of the cost (which is more probable when the group is small), the good will in fact be 
obtained, despite the free-rider problem. 
 
In large groups, however, public goods will only be obtained where there are 
individual incentives or sanctions (ibid., pp. 133-134). In the case of public goods provided by 
a national government, there are negative sanctions associated with not contributing (i.e., 
paying taxes); one runs the risk of being fined or sent to jail. At an organizational level, 
sanctions or incentives may take other forms:  
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Economic incentives are not, to be sure, the only incentives; people are sometimes 
also motivated by a desire to win prestige, respect, friendship, and other social and 
psychological objectives… The existence of these social incentives to group-oriented 
action does not, however, contradict or weaken the analysis of this study. If anything, 
it strengthens it, for social status and social acceptance are individual, noncollective 
goods. (ibid., pp. 60-61)   
 
Thus for an organization, coercion mechanisms may entail negative sanctions of either 
monetary value (fines) or social value (chastisement from other group members). They may 
also include positive, individual incentives of either monetary value (an individual good being 
offered along with the public good) or social value (recognition from other group members). 
Without coercion mechanisms of some sort, Olson argues that public goods will not be 
provided by large, voluntary organizations. Note that social coercion is much more effective in 
a small group, where all members know each other. Social incentives or sanctions are not 
particularly useful in groups where members do not know each other and do not have frequent 
contact with each other. 
 
Lobo (1982) points to some evidence that a lack of sanctions can be a limiting factor 
in Lima’s immigrant communities. Referring to a case study, she comments “the association 
did not have as much sanctioning power as an extended kin network to compel members to 
appear for work” (p. 155). There does not appear to be, however, more complete evidence on 
the use of sanctions in community organizations in Lima’s shantytowns. Social coercion will 
only be effective in a large group when that group is in actuality subdivided into small groups. 
In this “federated” scheme, social incentives can be used to induce members of small groups 
to participate in an action, though that action is being carried out by the larger umbrella 
organization (Olson, 1971, pp. 62-63).   
 
How small must a group be to allow members to monitor each other? As Runge 
(1986) points out “Sugden (1984) has argued that the more homogeneous a community, the 
more likely are optimal outcomes; the more heterogeneous, the more difficult coordination 
becomes” (p. 630). Thus size and heterogeneity may both be important in explaining public 
goods provision. Lobo (1982) indicates that this may be a limiting factor in Lima, where 
shantytowns composed of immigrants are likely to be more heterogeneous than would be the 
case in the rural communities from which they emigrated. Lobo finds evidence of this in one 
case study:  
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Much of the enthusiasm and optimism initially exhibited was the result of not only the 
prospect of rapid house construction but also the pervasive belief found in much of 
Peru that individuals from the Andean highlands have a great deal of skill, almost an 
innate ability, to cooperate in communal projects (see Patch 1959). Because of the 
need to interact with individuals who were of only short acquaintance, were neither 
kin nor paisanos, and with whom trust had not been built up through years of 
reciprocal interaction, however, the collaboration was not as smooth as expected. (p. 
154)  
 
Thus heterogeneity may be a barrier when urban communities seek public goods. 
 
It is important not to confuse the social sanctions previously mentioned with the idea 
of social capital, a concept much researched in economic development. Narayan (1999) uses 
the following definition of social capital: “the norms and social relations embedded in the 
social structures of society that enable people to co-ordinate action and to achieve desired 
goals” (p. 6). Recent empirical studies have focused on the importance of social capital in 
public goods production.  According to Meinzen-Dick et al. (2004), 
 
Studies show that social capital facilitates collective action (Krishna 2003; Ostrom 
1994, 1999; Putnam 1993, Schmid 2003:3; Dasgupta and Serageldin, 2000; Narayan 
and Pritchett 1997), so that empirical research must usually incorporate both concepts 
when analyzing collective action. (p. 9) 
 
Social capital is, however, in itself a public good. It can be a product of collective 
action; as group members work together, their bonds or networks may be reinforced and trust 
may be built. Accordingly, Grootaert and van Bastelaer (2002) argue that “social capital is 
both an input into and an output of collective action” (p. 9). Misztal (2000) describes the 
theoretical problem by saying  
 
[Putnam's] argument is rather circular: the key condition for overcoming dilemmas of 
collective action is the existence of a stock of social capital, but at the same time, the 
fostering of norms of reciprocity and networks of civic engagement requires pre-
existing solidarity and collaboration. (p. 121) 
 
For that reason, this study acknowledges the importance of social sanctions for 
successful collective action but does not evaluate the broader concept of social capital.  
 
The free-rider problem can, then, be overcome in small groups, through the use of 
coercion mechanisms, through a federated structure, and where heterogeneity is low.  It is not, 
however, the only limiting factor. Figueroa (2002) argues that the free-rider problem is a  
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barrier to public goods provision in poor communities; in addition he describes how real 
income restraints lead to the Maslowian problem:  
 
Individuals choose public goods in an attempt to satisfy their needs, which are ordered 
hierarchically. If their first-order (physiological) needs are not satisfied, they will 
satisfy them by choosing the appropriate goods. If their secondary needs (security) are 
not satisfied, they will satisfy them by choosing the appropriate goods, subject to the 
restriction that these goods also satisfy their primary needs.
3  (p. 77) 
 
Just as an individual’s demand for goods is determined by a hierarchical order of 
needs, a community’s collective action is subject to the community’s level of development. 
Some public goods will not be produced collectively even if the free-rider problem is absent 
because the action is not affordable, given the resources of the group. Collective action is 
costly for those who choose to cooperate (more so when there are free-riders), and thus 
demand for public goods will be limited by participants’ income levels. That is, collective 
goods will be chosen according to their placement on the hierarchy of needs, beginning with 
the most basic of needs. Both the level and structure of demand for public goods depends on a 
community’s income level; wealthier communities able to demand luxury goods will not cease 
to demand basic goods such as water and sewage lines. Figueroa (2003) thus argues that 
collective action will not be used to demand political or human rights in poor communities:  
 
The reason is not so much in the Olsonian problem… rather, in the fact that the 
community is so poor it can’t afford [collective action]. As such, it is not a problem of 
preferences, but a question of restrictions on real income. (p. 307)  
 
Some empirical studies have provided evidence that supports Figueroa’s argument.  
Walton (1997), for instance, argues that in times of recession, “collective action, when it does 
take place, is more likely to occur in the form of collective consumption and less often in the 
forms of labor (e.g. Strikes) or political rights (e.g. Social movements) contests” (p. 21). The 
Peruvian researcher Tanaka (2001) argues that  
 
Participation, in general, is ephemeral; it depends on specific objectives, it responds to 
certain needs and to a temporal cycle… it is fundamental that we not lose sight of the 
fact that participation and collective action in the communities of the popular sector 
are associated with specific demands, principally essential public goods and anti-
poverty strategies. (p. 17) 
 
                                                 
3   This and other quotations translated by author.  
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Dietz (1998) also finds evidence in Peru that limited buying power plays a role in 
determining what actions the poor will carry out (p. 12), showing that in times of economic 
crisis political demands become less common while communal activity remains important (p. 
231). Thus there is evidence that the “Maslowian problem” is indeed a limiting factor in 
collective action for public goods.   
 
Another Peruvian researcher, Joseph (1999) finds evidence in case studies of this 
trend, yet erroneously attributes it to the preferences of community organizations: “Since 
organizations today tend to focus on immediate tasks associated with survival, and apparently 
there is no will to look for structural changes, their political power has been reduced almost to 
the point of disappearing” (p. 114). It is important to remember that the Maslowian problem 
prevents us from determining a community’s preferences; if that community does not engage 
in collective action to demand rights, the Maslowian problem tells us that, rather than assume 
that the community is disinterested in obtaining rights, we must first consider the possibility 
that the community is restricted by its income level. 
 
Finally, Figueroa (2002) proposes a third barrier to successful collective action in poor 
communities, the exclusion problem, when arguing that “social groups that are considered 
second-class citizens, that do not have rights, that live in a society where the culture of 
inequality is highly developed, will not be able to carry out collective action” (pp. 76-77). 
These excluded groups are not able to fully participate in public decision-making processes 
because they have less access to information about those processes. Thus, participating for 
them would imply higher informational costs than it would for upper-class citizens:  
 
The cost of information refers to the cost of access to formal and informal means of 
communication. This cost refers not just to buying a newspaper, having a radio, a 
television, and the time to process that information; it also refers to access to all the 
information that is not available through mass media. This is the cost of not belonging 
to the social networks where options are discussed and clarified. If the poor suffer 
political and cultural exclusion, if they are segregated by the language they speak or 
the area where they live, the cost of access to information will be very high. (ibid., p. 
78)   
 
Thus groups that desire to carry out some collective action for the benefit of their 
community simply may not be able to (even if they have monetary resources and group 
members that are willing to contribute) if they are unable to access the necessary information 
(legal or political). The cost associated with attempting a collective initiative will be too great  
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where there is the risk that no benefits will be obtained. This is the case when a community 
believes its voice will not be heard.  
 
The exclusion problem will be particularly acute if a group attempts a collective 
initiative outside of its own community. This distinction is important because of the nature of 
public goods in societies with a high degree of inequality.  In developed economies with less 
inequality, public goods are more “pure” in the sense that everyone in the economy has access 
to those goods. This is not the case, however, in countries like Peru. When inequality is 
widespread and markets are highly segmented, not all members of society will have equal 
access to public goods. That is, public goods are not as purely public as they are in more equal 
societies (Figueroa, 1993, pp. 138-139). Thus a public good may benefit all members of 
society, or it may benefit only the community who demanded the good. There is evidence in 
rural Peru that collective action at the community level is common, but initiatives on a greater 
scale are nonexistent, because of the problem of exclusion (Figueroa, 2002, pp. 76-77).   
 
Wiarda (1974) writes about the hierarchical nature of many Latin American societies 
and the barrier this has been for development, claiming that Latin American countries have 
remained largely unchanged since colonial times, and saying:  
 
All this is of course is not to imply that there were no changes at all in the Iberic-Latin 
nations, for in fact the changes were many and frequently significant. But the point 
made … is that the changes that have occurred have generally been carefully 
controlled and regulated, limited and structured, so as to adapt to newer social and 
ideological forces without in the process undermining traditional institutions and 
values or provoking social revolution. Change has taken place gradually, 
incrementally, and as much as possible within certain prescribed parameters consistent 
with the historic, traditional structures and patterns described here. (p. 272) 
 
He concludes that “in the more fundamental sense implying a sharp socio-political 
break with the past, the Iberic-Latin nations have remained profoundly nonrevolutionary in 
character” (p. 269), and that “considerable change can and does take place in this type system, 
but it usually comes from the top downwards and not necessarily as a result of grass roots 
pressures from below” (p. 276). In other words, Latin American countries continue to operate 




In speaking of the type of public goods sought by poor urban communities, it is 
important to note that public goods must be maintained once they have been provided. That is, 
in addition to determining the Maslowian level of a collective action initiative, we must also 
consider whether that collective action seeks to provide a new public good or to maintain a 
previously provided public good. This maintenance may be associated with typical capital 
goods depreciation. It may also, however, be associated with protecting the public good from 
outside shocks. Most researchers agree that poverty is associated with a higher degree of risk.  
Runge (1986) maintains that “poverty, together with a dependence on low value-added outputs 
and relatively randomly distributed natural resources, results in a high degree of uncertainty 
with respect to income streams. Poverty eliminates the cushion against adversity represented 
by accumulated wealth” (p. 625). Roca Rey (2003), in her article on defining poverty, writes 
about the “vulnerability approach” (p. 24). According to this approach, “the poor are 
perceived to be at a greater risk in terms of lacking the necessary protection mechanisms, 
which in turn makes them more vulnerable” (ibid., 29). Rural studies will naturally focus on 
external shocks associated with environmental uncertainty (see for instance Southgate et al.’s 
2001 study on land management and El Niño): “the random element in natural resource 
allocation introduces additional uncertainty for those whose income depends on the rain 
falling or the hunt succeeding” (Runge, 1986, p. 625). In an urban context, the shock may not 
be environmental. Roberts (n.d.) briefly alludes to this when arguing that “citizen-based 
collective action [in Latin America] seeks to access the opportunities and avoid the risks 
present in the existing economic structure” (p. 10). It can be argued that urban collective 
action may be a response to shocks that could be environmental, economic, or political in 
nature. Examples include an earthquake, an epidemic, the opening of trade markets and its 
effect on urban production units, changes in land use laws, or changes in food transfer policy.  
The shocks adversely affect the urban poor who are excluded from protection mechanisms 
such as insurance (to protect against theft or a natural disaster) or who are excluded from the 
political process (leading to policy changes that harm poor communities). Shocks can, 
however, also work to decrease free-riding behaviors.  Sober and Wilson (1998), in their work 
on altruism, suggest that in times of crisis, humans may feel more compelled to work in 
groups:  
 
Behaving as part of a coordinated group is sometimes a life-or-death matter in which 
the slightest error —or the slightest reluctance to participant— can result in disaster 
for all.  Situations of this sort —in which the members of a group are bound together 
by the prospect of a common fate— have been encountered throughout human 
evolution, with important fitness consequences, so it is reasonable to expect that we  
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are psychologically adapted to cope with them… the other-oriented psychology 
triggered by the crisis in the open boat differs from the more individualistic feelings 
experienced in other contexts. (pp. 335-336) 
 
In other words, when a group of people experience a common crisis (such as en 
environmental, economic, or political shock), they will tend less towards individualistic free-
riding behavior and more towards collective action.   
 
There is a great deal of evidence in Peru pointing to the work of community 
organizations in the provision of new public works (see for instance Ypeij 2000; Lobo 1982); 
even De Soto (1989), well-known for his claims about the potential of the Peruvian poor to 
become productive entrepreneurs, writes about the acquisition of new goods (pp. 17-27). 
There has been, however, little work done on the need to maintain these public works, or the 
need to protect them from outside shocks. 
 
In summary, three barriers are theorized to restrict the ability of low-income urban 
communities to work collectively: the free-rider problem, the Maslowian problem, and the 
exclusion problem. These barriers have appeared in some of the applied research done in Peru, 
but an economic model is lacking, as is wide-spread empirical evidence. 
 
3.  ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK: DEVELOPING A MODEL FOR PUBLIC 
GOODS PRODUCTION 
 
This study uses a regressive logit model where the endogenous variable 
Collective_Action is a binary variable defined by whether an action had been met with 
success. As shown in the previous section, the variables that can affect the level and structure 
of collective action carried out in a community are: the Olsonian free-rider problem (including 
group size, coercion mechanisms, a federated versus non-federated structure, heterogeneity, 
and the presence of a shock that incites altruism), the Maslowian problem (including the cost 
of the good demanded relative to the community’s income level, the Maslowian level of the 
good demanded), and the exclusion problem (including a lack of access to information, and a 
low cost/benefit ratio). Thus the proposed model can be described by the following equation: 
 
Collective_Action is determined by the following factors: group size, coercion 
mechanisms, federation, homogeneity, shock, development, monetary cost, time cost, basic  
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good, advanced good, educational level of leaders, exclusion by geographic origin, potential 
beneficiaries. 
 
Group size,  monetary cost,  time cost, and heterogeneity are all interval variables 
expected to have a negative effect on the ability to carry out a collective action. Coercion 
mechanisms and federation are binary variables expected to have a positive effect on 
collective action. For the Peruvian case, exclusion is measured using two proxy variables: 
educational level of leaders (an ordinal variable expected to have a positive effect on 
collective action) and exclusion by geographic origin (an interval variable expected to have a 
negative effect on collective action). Potential beneficiaries is a nominal variable (taking a 
value of 0 where beneficiaries are only the group members and 1 where the good would 
benefit people outside the organization) expected to have a negative effect on collective 
action.  Shock is a nominal variable expected to have a positive effect on collective action, 
while development is a nominal variable expected to have a negative effect on collective 
action.  Maslowian level was broken into three categories: basic good, security good, and 
advanced good; the two dummies used were basic good (expected to have a positive effect on 






Determining Factors  Theoretical Origin  Form of Measurement 
Group size  Olsonian problem  Number of registered members in a group 
Monetary cost 
Olsonian problem, Maslowian 
problem 
Amount of Nuevos Soles
4 paid to obtain 
the public good 
Time cost 
Olsonian problem, Maslowian 
problem 
Number of participant hours needed to 
obtain the public good 
Heterogeneity Olsonian  problem 
Diversity of group members' geographic 
origins (coast, mountains, jungle) 
Coercion mechanisms  Olsonian problem 
Existence or lack thereof of individual 
sanctions or incentives to participation in 
collective action 
Federation Olsonian  problem 
Existence or lack thereof of a federated 
group structure 
Educational level of 
leaders Exclusion  problem 
Average educational level of leaders 
(ranging from no education to advanced 
degrees) 
Exclusion by 
geographic origin  Exclusion problem 
Average geographic origin of group 
members (from more 'excluded' areas such 
as the mountains and the jungle or from 
less 'excluded' areas such as the coast or the 
capital city) 
Potential beneficiaries  Exclusion problem 
Those expected to benefit from the 
provision of the public good (community 
members versus a wider public) 
Shock Olsonian  problem 
Existence or lack thereof of a crisis or 
emergency 
Development Maslowian  problem 
Existence or lack thereof of an attempt to 
develop a new good (as opposed to 
maintenance of a previously obtained 
good) 
Basic good  Maslowian problem 
Lowest-level good on the Maslowian 
pyramid (including food, water, shelter) 
Advanced good  Maslowian problem 
Highest-level good on the Maslowian 
pyramid (including intellectual 
advancement, spiritual enlightenment) 
 
 
4.   FIELDWORK IN LIMA 
 
  Recent macroeconomic gains in Peru have not alleviated the country’s pervasive 
poverty.  According to data from a national household survey, 57% of Peru’s population was 
in poverty and 27% was in extreme poverty in 1991.  By 2001, GDP had grown by 21%, but 
55% of the population was still in poverty and 24% in extreme poverty (Aramburu and 
Portocarrero, 2002). Much of this poverty is found in rural areas, especially in the Andean 
                                                 
4   Peruvian currency.  
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mountains and the Amazon jungle.  Metropolitan Lima, however, is still home to poor families 
and poor communities. 
 
  The first shantytowns in Lima were constructed in the 1930s along the Rimac River, 
between downtown and the port of Callao (Driant, 1991, p. 40). Sporadic construction 
continued to occur for several decades, although it was not until the 1950s that massive 
invasiones
5 began to change metropolitan Lima’s landscape. Through the 1950s, 1960s and 
1970s the city’s barriers expanded rapidly as entire districts were occupied, such as 
Independencia to the north (Driant, 1991, p. 50) and Villa El Salvador to the south (Driant 61). 
Lima’s population grew from 520,000 in 1940 (Driant, 1991, p. 45) to 3,303,000 in 1972 
(Driant, 1991, p. 60), with much of this new growth in shantytowns. By 1981 it was estimated 
that almost 1.5 million people lived in Lima’s shantytowns, representing 13.7% of the city’s 
population (Driant, 1991, p. 68).   
 
  Driant further writes that  
 
Lima is profoundly marked by its shantytowns. A foreign observer that were to 
traverse the city from the north to the south, passing through downtown, would not 
cease to be surprised by the great heterogeneity of the urban landscape, by its 
extension and by the impression of visiting a vast construction site… Today, the 
shantytown is an indissoluble part of the image of Lima. (p. 15) 
 
The residents of today’s shantytowns are no longer solely rural migrants: “the new 
generation of poor families is Limeñan and their culture is urban, from the shantytowns. [This 
generation] knows all about the fight for housing” (p. 191). Shantytowns have become an 
inseparable part of Lima’s landscape and of the lives of many Limeñans. 
 
  While these shantytowns have been targets for aid from NGOs and governmental 
programs, they have also been frequently left to fend for themselves when obtaining basic 
services, such as water, electricity, and paved streets (Ypeij, 2000, 19; Riofrio, 1987, 135). 
Dietz (1998) writes that 
 
As [economic conditions] continued too worsen, the poor turned to their own devices, 
such as they were.  And although some might praise the poor for their resourcefulness, 
                                                 
5   Literally translated as “invasions,” this process refers to the planned, overnight occupation of 
unused or underused lands by large groups of poor settlers.  An invasión is the initial formation 
of a shantytown.  For a more detailed description of this and other terms, see Appendix E.  
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the degree to which the city of Lima physically deteriorated delegimated the state to a 
considerable degree. (p. 232)   
 




According to the model developed in the previous section, interviews were designed 
and carried out in shantytowns across Lima. The districts represented were Cercado de Lima, 
San Juan de Miraflores, San Martin de Porras, Villa El Salvador, and Villa Maria del Perpetuo 
Socorro. The communities selected represented different ages, locations, and levels of 
economic development. As Driant (1991) aptly points out, the shantytowns of Lima do not 
represent a homogeneous reality (p. 125). The oldest settlement interviewed for this study had 
first been occupied in 1940, the youngest in 2000.  They had built on state lands, agricultural 
lands, garbage dumps, hillsides, and the unstable banks of the Rimac River. Their inhabitants 
were second or third-generation Limeñans and immigrants from diverse provinces, 
representing the coast, the mountains, and the jungle. Finally, the community leaders 
(dirigentes) interviewed represented different types of organizations: 
•  Asociaciones de pobladores: neighborhood organizations 
•  Comedores populares: communal kitchens 
•  Comités de Vaso de Leche: Glass of Milk committees 
•  APAFAs: parents’ associations at public schools 
•  Cooperativas de mercados: market vendor cooperatives and associations 
•  Mesas de Concertación: anti-poverty forums 
 
Note that the central question was not what differed a comedor popular from an 
asociación de pobladores, or what differed settlements in Cercado de Lima from those in Villa 
María del Perpetuo Socorro. That is, distinctions were made based solely on the variables 
discussed in the previous section. 
 
Twenty-four organizations were studied, typically with three interviews per 
organization. During the preliminary interview basic data was obtained from a group leader on 
recent collective actions (any actions occurring before 1990 were dropped from the data set 
because of incomplete information). Two subsequent interviews (with the group leader from 
the preliminary interview and then with a second group leader) allowed for data collection on  
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the details of each collective action. Two organizations were dropped from the study due to 
incomplete information. Each organization offered information on approximately ten 
collective actions, and the final sample size was 121 instances of collective action. 
 
Note that these twenty-four organizations did not represent a random sample. No 
database of community organizations in metropolitan Lima exists from which to draw a 
random selection. Further details on how organizations were chosen are given in the following 
section; they were not chosen because they were particularly rich or particularly poor, or 
because they were especially successful or especially unsuccessful. As such they should 
represent a fairly unbiased (though not statistically random) sample of Lima’s organizations. 
 
4.2 Data  Collection 
From September 2004 through January 2005, I lived with a family in a shantytown in 
Cercado de Lima, the original downtown Lima. Like other asentamientos humanos in Cercado 
de Lima, it was over fifty years old and had been built along the unstable banks of the Rimac 
River. The original settlers had been primarily employed in nearby factories, which later 
closed when trade was liberalized (many complained that imports from Asia were the cause of 
the loss of their jobs). On one hand, the area is far more developed than newer shantytowns; 
there are three-story homes and cable television lines. Residents also benefit from a central 
location; they can reach downtown by bus in less than ten minutes.  On the other hand, there 
are still structural problems, public health problems, and crime. The river banks periodically 
collapse, and the foundations of many homes are cracked and sinking. Poverty is not as severe 
as in newer settlements, but the area continues to be plagued by diseases like tuberculosis and 
social problems like drug use and prostitution. 
 
As I gained trust amongst residents and community leaders, my initial interviews were 
in these neighborhoods in Cercado de Lima. My connections to the neighborhood proved to be 
the key to obtaining quality interviews with community leaders. Initial distrust on the part of 
the informants I contacted was dispelled once it became clear that I was to some degree part of 
the community. As I began interviews in other districts, I continued to use connections to 
arrive at sites where I would be trusted. For some shantytowns this meant first meeting with 
church leadership, for another, making contacts through a nonprofit cultural group for at-risk 
youth. When attempts were made to conduct interviews at sites where I had no connection, 
distrust was too severe to obtain adequate information.  
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Trust proved to be vitally important, but at times difficult to obtain. Some community 
leaders suspected I had political or journalistic motives. In most case this dissipated over time; 
leaders that were unwilling to be tape-recorded at the first interview were willing to be 
recorded during subsequent interviews. Several organizations hoped that I would be able to 
provide them with funding from international NGOs, despite my explanations that I was a 
student researcher with no such connections. One organization, an asociación de pobladores, 
was accustomed to receiving student researchers from local universities. In this case such prior 
experience made the organization more difficult to interview. The group’s leaders wanted to 
provide only certain information, only on certain terms. They were willing to read from their 
neighborhood’s memoirs, and they produced for me copies of their organization’s newsletter.  
In general, they had learned to expect (from past student researchers) very general questions, 
and they were unwilling throughout our communications to provide answers to more specific 
questions. This group was eventually removed from the study sample because of inadequate 
information. The final aspect of site visits that made interviewing difficult was that in older 
neighborhoods the original community leaders were no longer alive. Current leaders were able 
to provide details on only the most recent actions their organizations had taken. 
 
In general, however, organizations were eager to be interviewed and eager to share 
their organizational history, including both its successes and its failures. The president of one 
asociación de pobladores, in a somewhat dangerous part of town, accompanied me through 
the neighborhood to take pictures. At another asociación de pobladores, we ran well over the 
allotted interview time because of the informant’s eagerness to share information on all of the 
work that her group had done. 
 
Site visits also brought unexpected opportunities to observe collective action in 
progress. A recyclers’ association
6 in the area where I was living began to encounter problems 
with municipal authorities shortly after I had moved into the neighborhood. The national 
regulations on recycling had been rewritten, authorizing municipal authorities to seize the 
vehicles and goods of unregistered recyclers. This shock to the informal recycling sector 
(whose numbers in Peru are estimated in the tens of thousands), brought about renewed 
interest in the recyclers’ association. I watched over the next few months as that association 
                                                 
6   Known as recicladores, recaladores, pepenadores, or cartoneros, recyclers collect solid waste 
(including metal, plastic, rubber, paper, electronics, and more), then sell it to middlemen.  They 
make up a largely informal secondary waste collection market in many developing countries.  
Some recyclers have formed cooperatives and associations; the degree of organization varies 
from country to country.  
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grew from approximately 70 to around 200 through the work of the association’s leaders.  
Meetings began to be held approximately once a week in the street outside my house as the 
association recruited new members in an effort to show a unified force to the municipal and 
national government.  At the time of this writing their efforts were still underway. 
 
  In another instance I was scheduled to meet with community leaders from various 
neighborhoods. Their different asociaciones de pobladores were working together under an 
umbrella organization to protest what they considered to be unfairly high municipal tax rates.  
When I arrived at our meeting place, I found not just a few community leaders but over 100 
people with megaphones and banners, preparing a protest march. I followed the march through 
several neighborhoods. They eventually blocked a major intersection until a meeting could be 
scheduled with a representative from the municipal government. At the time of this writing 
those community leaders had completed negotiations with the municipality, obtaining partial 
leniency for their neighborhoods. 
 
4.3 Qualitative  Results 
The following section presents qualitative observations, gathered from almost a year 
of site visits and interviews. The cases presented offer support to the economic model given 
above; they also, it is hoped, give a picture of how development occurs in the context of a 
shantytown. Again, the three barriers proposed are the free-rider problem (in which 
community members choose not to participate because no individual gain is offered), the 
resource constraint problem (in which a community’s narrow budget limits the scope and 
nature of possible projects), and the exclusion problem (in which groups have little 
information or political influence). The qualitative data collected during field work gives 
preliminary support to all three hypotheses made in this paper. 
 
  The first barrier observed was the free-rider problem, in which members were 
unwilling to take individual risks for a group’s collective gain. This was worsened where 
group members had built up an expectation that risks and costs would be assumed by an 
outside charity. The problem was lessened when individual incentives were used. The 
presence of a “shock,” or emergency, also reduced the number of free-riders. Some groups 
utilized a federated structure to prevent free-riding. 
  
  22
  Free-riding was observed in many of the instances of collective action. Informants 
were not asked directly about a lack of participation in their projects, but many informants 
complained that this was a problem. When asked what projects had been attempted but not 
completed, one informant (from a Vaso de Leche committee) responded “we couldn’t hold 
[the fundraiser] because sometimes [the members] don’t support you. Five or six people do it, 
and the rest don’t help out. Everyone’s off on their own; it doesn’t seem to interest them. And 
that disheartens you.” In this instance the cost of the project was relatively minimal, but the 
group leaders were unable to obtain donations from other members. It should be noted that 
this relates also to the resource constraint problem; even a relatively minimal contribution may 
be a large part of a family’s daily budget.  Some of the women I interviewed who participated 
in Vaso de Leche committees or comedores populares did not work, and had to ask their 
husbands for a daily market allowance. 
 
  In another instance of free-riding, a vendors’ association at a market had been formed 
to buy the land the market was on. When the market had been built five years prior, individual 
vendors (who didn’t then know each other), bought plots from a real estate company. That 
company had bought the land with a bank loan, which was still being paid off.  As the real 
estate company was unable to sell out all the spaces in the market, they were also unable to 
make their mortgage payments. As a result, some of the vendors decided to form an 
association which would make payments (for their individual plots) directly to the bank, 
instead of to the real estate company, in an effort to not have their plots repossessed by the 
bank. Their eventual goal was to buy the plot of land where the market is located (and the 
physical infrastructure of the market space) and make all payments directly to the bank. Of the 
approximately 160 vendors in the market, around 55 had joined the association. The other 115 
vendors did not want to join the association until they could be assured of the association’s 
success. If the association were indeed successful in purchasing the market, all 160 vendors 
would receive the same benefit, namely, reducing the risk of repossession. In this instance, 
then, there is a rate of free-riding of approximately 66%. These 115 vendors were unwilling to 
take a personal financial risk when the success of the project depended on the entire group. A 
number of other organizations also complained about a lack of participation in their projects, 
saying that leaders invested a great deal of time and money in the organizations’ initiatives, 
whereas members (who would indeed reap any of the benefits of public goods obtained by the 
leaders) were reluctant to contribute. 
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  Free-riding appeared to be worsened in some cases by a belief by group members that 
certain public goods could be obtained without any financial contributions by the group itself, 
either through a government donation or a non-governmental organization (like a charitable 
group). A few leaders reported finding it more difficult to encourage participation for this 
reason. 
 
  Some organizations used individual incentives and individual sanctions to reduce the 
number of free-riders. Group members were more likely to assume individual costs or 
individual risks when participating would benefit them as individuals. Many groups used a 
simple fines system: any member that didn’t attend a meeting or event was fined five or ten 
soles (approximately $1.50 to $3.00).  Other organizations used more complicated methods of 
sanctioning nonparticipation. These appeared to be particularly important during a 
neighborhood’s initial occupation. One informant described how the distribution of plots of 
land in a new occupation was determined by how much different members had participated in 
collective initiatives:  
 
It was like this. Say that I had built my shanty, from one, two, three straw mats, the 
door and the roof. A week goes by, and you’ve got to tear down your shanty. Why?  
Because it was your turn in some other place. They relocated you; that’s what it was, 
relocation. Why was there relocation?  Because you needed to occupy your plots 24 
hours a day
7…  Besides that, you needed to be up to date with your quota payments.  
So what happened then? That there were days when you didn’t work. So then, where 
you could get the money [to pay your quota]? You got behind, and they started 
marking you down as a debtor.  Then as a debtor, you went to one part, and the people 
who paid on time when to the better plots.  So you were like a gypsy, you could be 
fifteen days in one place, stable, just like you could be [only] two or three days.  
Relocation: so-and-so. So-and-so: you’re gone. So-and-so: you stay. You had to undo 
your shanty, take down your straw mats. 
 
In other words, not helping the group out would mean that a person or a family would 
be forced to move their home (in this case built with a few straw mats), at the will of the group 
leaders. This informant also said the families that participated less were given the worst plots 
when the final distribution was decided. This is an extremely strong incentive for an individual 
to participate in the group’s activities.   
 
The presence of a shock also appeared to reduce the number of free-riders in many 
instances, as predicted by the theory that under crisis conditions altruistic behavior will prevail 
                                                 
7   This requirement, imposed by the occupation’s organizers, was termed vivencia.  
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over self interest (Sober and Wilson 1998, 335-336). Previously the case of a recyclers’ 
association was introduced.  Each recycler gathered materials independently, then sold them to 
middlemen for cash. They operated without regulations; they also operated without the 
protection that a formal business provides (sick pay, a retirement pension, etc.). The 
organization was first formed when the city’s mayor decided to eliminate informal recycling 
activity. City policemen had begun to harass the recyclers; the president reported  
 
They started to take away our carts; they hit us… “No, no, no,” I said.  “We’re going 
to get all the recyclers we can, let’s see how many we are…”  So one recycler passes 
the word on to another… and that recycler passes the word on to another and another: 
such and such day we’re going to have a meeting, just of recyclers.  The leaders were 
chosen, and that leadership team started talking to an NGO. 
 
The recyclers knew that if they didn’t work together to win recognition from the city, 
they were in danger of losing their jobs. They were unskilled and would not be able to obtain 
other employment. This was an emergency that warranted acting as a group; the association 
would have more clout than any individual. 
 
The recyclers’ association had been in existence for a number of years when the 
recyclers’ livelihood was again threatened. Membership was limited to approximately seventy 
informal recycler “scavengers” (out of an estimated tens of thousands of recyclers in 
metropolitan Lima). Their activity was now technically illegal; a national law prohibited 
informal recycling. This law had not been enforced before, but the city was threatening to 
enforce it. City policemen had resumed harassing the recyclers. The association started 
holding public meetings, and it began to attract new members (at the time of this writing, 
approximately two hundred). When asked how he planned to get more people to join the 
association, the president replied “that’s no problem. When there’s trouble, the people come 
and sign themselves right up.” In a crisis, the informal workers were much more willing to act 
collectively. 
 
  There were many other instances of increased activity following a shock for a number 
of different organizations. These efforts, like those of the recyclers, also appeared to be more 
successful.  For instance: 
•  A neighborhood association received contributions from 100% of its members when 
their possession of the land was threatened. Not acting as a group in this instance  
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could have meant the members would lose their homes. For the development of new 
public goods projects (not following a shock), participation was about 50%. 
•  A communal kitchen received rice donations on a regular basis from the government.  
The government stopped sending rice (considered a staple of the lunch they cook), 
sending  morón, a wheat product, instead. The communal kitchens considered this 
product to be inferior and unacceptable; they felt they could not provide adequate 
lunches to community members using the wheat product as a base.  So they organized 
together to demand rice. Following the communal kitchens’ protest outside 
government buildings, the government switched back to rice donations. This scenario 
was played out in communal kitchens and Glass of Milk committees whenever there 
were changes in government policy, like a threatened reduction in subsidies, a 
reduction in the quantity or quality of supplies sent out, or a cut in health insurance 
coverage for members of communal kitchens or Glass of Milk committees.   
•  Some problems arose on a regular basis, but are considered here to be shocks because 
they affected the ability of an organization to perform its basic functions. For instance, 
communal kitchens frequently experienced malfunctions of their stovetops.  While this 
could happen several times a year, it is considered a shock because it disrupted the 
work of the organization; if collective action were not organized to fix the stove, the 
communal kitchen could not function at all. Some communal kitchens solved the 
problem by using their group’s savings to hire a technician to make repairs. Others, 
once the stove ceased to function all together, applied for a new donated stovetop. 
Only one kitchen interviewed chose instead to perform regular preventative 
maintenance work on the stovetop. Another reoccurring problem for many kitchens 
and Glass of Milk committees was theft of food supplies or of cooking equipment. All 
of these instances represented emergencies that needed to be addressed immediately 
by the entire group. 
•  In some neighborhoods, residents owed municipal taxes dating back several years 
(which had accrued an impressive amount of fines and interest). After those residents 
began to receive notices that the municipality would soon repossess their homes, 
community leaders were able to mobilize enough members and gather enough support 
to put pressure on the municipality to reduce the fines and interest and to coordinate 
repayment plans.  
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In all of these instances, group leaders found it much easier to obtain participation and 
financial contributions following some shock that severely affected the individual members.  
In an emergency, free-riding becomes less common and individual incentives or sanctions 
become less necessary. As one neighborhood president stated, “when there are problems, 
absolutely everyone is mobilized… we were 400 or 500 people… that’s the average for when 
there are problems… that’s when people come to the meetings.” 
 
Not surprisingly, in instances where a shock encouraged an organization to obtain a 
public good (and where the free-riding problem was temporarily reduced), the free-rider 
problem eventually returned. This made maintenance of the good obtained more difficult, and 
in some cases, impossible. As predicted by the model presented above, maintenance of 
previously won goods sometimes proved more difficult than the original provision of the 
goods themselves. For instance, one neighborhood was experiencing a level of street crime the 
residents felt was unacceptable. They saw their quality of life at risk, and in 2004 they decided 
to hire off-duty policemen to patrol.  Each block contributed to the expense, even though no 
sanctions were in place, because they wanted to solve a specific, urgent problem. In 2005, the 
program no longer was functioning because there were no longer enough contributions from 
the neighborhood’s blocks. Similarly, a parents’ association at a public school wanted to 
remove street vendors from the stretch of road outside the school’s main entrance because of 
fears of unsanitary conditions and food poisoning. With the help of the municipality and the 
local police force they succeeded in removing the vendors at a minimal cost. Enforcement was 
not continued, however, and the street vendors returned. It had been much easier to rally 
support for the initial solution to the problem than it was to obtain continuing support. 
 
Free-riding is more difficult to avoid when there is no shock present. Maintenance of 
public goods is more difficult for community leaders to carry out than is provision of new 
public goods following an emergency. This is not to say that leaders prefer not to maintain 
goods or that they prefer to work after a shock. We must assume that preferences do not 
change in the presence or absence of a shock, since we cannot measure people’s preferences.  
Rather, these observations seem to offer support to the argument that participation of members 
is easier to obtain following a shock. Thus while free-riding is a barrier to collective action in 
low income communities, coercion mechanisms and the presence of a shock both work to 
reduce that barrier. 
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Observations from site visits and interviews also suggested that federation can reduce 
the free-riding problem; there were cases of small organizations that belonged to larger 
umbrella organizations. From the instances researched for this paper, communal kitchens and 
Glass of Milk committees made use of a federated structure particularly frequently. To 
organize a march of several thousand protesters, the umbrella organization would call for the 
support of the smaller organizations. The smaller organizations could then use the sanctions 
and incentives mechanisms they had in place (social sanctions, monetary fines, etc.) to 
encourage members to participate in a rally. This was the system used whenever the 
organizations wanted to protest a change in government policy that affected the work of their 
groups. There were also instances, in three of the five districts interviewed, of neighborhood 
associations using umbrella organizations to organize protests when more members were 
needed. A neighborhood’s president would likely know members of every household, and 
could use these social relationships to encourage participation in the federated group’s action.  
Whereas individuals might not participate in a group of several thousand (feeling that their 
own presence would have minimal impact), they would participate as members of a smaller 
group. 
 
In summary, the free-riding problem was apparent in the groups interviewed, but 
groups had developed different techniques to combat this problem: offering incentives or 
enforcing sanctions, initiating collective action immediately after a shock, or joining with 
other groups to form a federated structure. These three methods allowed groups to obtain more 
participation and thus a greater likelihood of success. 
 
  The second barrier is the resource constraint problem, which says that organizations in 
low-income communities will first work to obtain the most basic goods. Since their income is 
limited, they will not be able to obtain every public good they wish to obtain. This has two 
implications. First, some goods will be completely unaffordable. Second, if a group has a 
choice between two affordable goods, the group will first work to obtain the more basic good.  
In addition, if the basic goods they have already obtained are threatened, they will need to 
protect those goods before they can make demands for more advanced goods (like political 
rights). This was supported by observations from the shantytowns visited. A number of 
organizations stated directly that they were not able to obtain the public goods they desired 
because they were unaffordable. Also, when residents are faced with the choice of using their 
income to fulfill basic needs (food, water, electricity) and using their income to contribute to a  
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collective cause (political rights, recreational goods), they will first spend their income on the 
former.   
 
  Note that the limited income problem can restrict access to advanced goods in multiple 
ways, including in many cases the fact that advanced goods can also cost more. Not only will 
low income organizations have fewer resources available to devote to advanced goods 
(because they must first spend their resources on basic goods), but advanced goods (like a 
lengthy fight for political rights) may cost more. The case of one relatively young 
neighborhood association (founded in 2000) illustrates this well; let’s call that shantytown San 
Gabriel. San Gabriel had been built next to an older, unrelated shantytown, which we’ll call El 
Cerro. The residents of San Gabriel hoped to acquire property titles for the land they occupied.  
To do this, they needed to go to the government office that gives property titles to shantytowns 
and complete a number of forms. El Cerro had, however, already obtained the property titles 
to San Gabriel’s land, by simply going to the same government office before San Gabriel’s 
leaders went. San Gabriel now feared that they would have to pay rent to El Cerro, which had 
in effect become San Gabriel’s landlord. San Gabriel’s neighborhood association wanted to 
hire a lawyer to win back the property title, but simply could not afford to do so.  As a result, 
they were at risk of losing their homes. 
 
In a different, much older neighborhood, the communal building (typically used for 
assemblies, community events, workshops, childcare, etc) had become structurally unsound.  
This neighborhood had been built decades before on top of a garbage dump. As the garbage 
settled, all of the shantytown’s buildings had become structurally unsound.  Large cracks were 
visible in exterior walls, and some houses had sunk at odd angles.  It always seemed like half 
of the houses were being repaired; the neighborhood was perpetually in construction. When 
asked why the communal building had not yet been repaired, the neighborhood association 
cited a lack of funds. A number of attempts had been made to bring services to the site, 
including daycare, a job resource center and a low-cost medical clinic, but all had failed 
because of the building’s high level of disrepair. When I toured the building, it was empty 
except for a communal kitchen occupying a side room. Patching up the building was out of the 
organization’s budget; having engineers provide a permanent solution for the entire 
neighborhood was clearly even more unlikely. A number of other organizations cited limited 
income as a barrier to successfully completing collective initiatives. 
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In many instances, neighborhoods faced additional costs when organizing for a public 
good.  This was related to the order in which collective actions needed to take place. That is, 
some public goods could not be obtained until other public goods had been obtained.  In many 
instances the prerequisite was expensive, time-consuming paperwork.  For instance, a Glass of 
Milk committee was unable to solicit donations because they weren’t legally registered. In 
another neighborhood, a vendors’ association at a market wanted to make repairs to the 
market’s roof but couldn’t because they did not yet have property titles. In other instances, one 
physical improvement first required another. A new neighborhood on a hilltop could not be 
reached by the municipal water truck until streets were built. That is, the community had to 
first finance construction of roads wide enough for a truck before they could get water.   
Another neighborhood did not have a sewage system or paved streets; sewage lines had to be 
built before streets could be paved. In summary, organizations sometimes had to finance 
multiple projects to obtain the good the residents really desired. This was especially frustrating 
for group leaders when the prerequisite was costly paperwork. 
 
One informant, a past president of a neighborhood association, reported that collective 
initiatives had been completed in the following order in her shantytown: 
•  Occupying the land, 1980 
•  Forming a leadership team, 1981 
•  Organizing neighborhood security patrols (by residents), 1982 
•  Flattening out the land, 1983 
•  Obtaining a communal land title, 1984 
•  Hiring a security guard, 1984 
•  Building water lines, 1985 
•  Getting legal recognition of the neighborhood, 1986 
•  Installing electricity, 1988 
•  Paving the streets, 1992 
•  Building a library, 1997 
•  Putting in steps to the main road, 2000 
•  Constructing a second wall along soccer court, 2001 
•  Planting a communal garden, 2004  
 
Note that the first projects completed were related to basic needs: of the first nine 
initiatives, six are related to occupying the site and then maintaining possession and the other  
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three are related to making the area habitable. Only then were “luxury” goods, like paved 
streets and a library and garden, obtained.   
 
The informant further explained that the later projects had been more difficult to 
organize:  
 
What did we have to do? Organize. Of course much earlier, when we founded this 
place, we were organized. But once there were electricity, water, property titles, and 
sidewalks, people didn’t want to do anything. So I started to organize, block by block.  
Stopping at the last block, organizing, calling assemblies: “this block needs a leader.”  
It was time. 
 
Several neighborhood associations reported similar processes; as the neighborhood 
obtained basic goods and began to organize for more advanced “luxury” goods, collective 
action became less common. Some neighborhoods, even after decades of self-improvement, 
were unable to obtain advanced goods or reduce poverty. This was attributed to two factors: 
first, that educated families had moved to wealthier neighborhoods and been replaced by poor 
immigrants from rural areas, and second, that factory closings had left many residents 
unemployed or underemployed. Note that this would make advanced public goods more 
difficult to obtain; residents in poverty would still spend their income on basic individual 
goods (food, cooking fuel, etc), leaving little to no funds available for advanced public goods. 
 
This also appeared to be related to the level of individual incentives used. When 
neighborhoods were first occupied, failing to contribute to a collective cause could lead to 
losing one’s home. Sanctions became more difficult to impose as households took possession 
of plots of land. One neighborhood president, when asked if any public works projects had 
recently been completed, replied  
 
No. Let me explain.  For example, we have the communal building, which was built 
by the community and with the [financial] support of all the members. So what did 
they do? At that time, in the beginning of every neighborhood, when there’s an 
occupation and that kind of thing, everyone pays attention because they want to be 
registered [on their plot]; otherwise, they don’t get registered, it doesn’t happen. So 
since there was that pressure, to not be left hanging, to [keep their homes], then it was 
a lot easier.  For example pretty much everyone came to the assemblies. 
 
The president furthermore reported that individual sanctions were no longer being 
used.  In other words, older neighborhood associations were less likely to be successful in  
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their initiatives because effective sanctions couldn’t be imposed and because advanced 
“luxury” goods were more difficult to obtain. 
 
  Communal kitchens also reported more success in basic initiatives. One comedor 
popular reported having success in at least four initiatives that related directly to the 
preparation of meals (food is considered a basic good). They had not, however, in their almost 
20 years of activity, been able to purchase tables and benches to allow customers to eat in the 
communal kitchen, although they had “always wanted them.” In other words, even tables and 
benches could be considered unnecessary “luxury” goods, secondary to more pressing needs, 
as long as customers could take their meals home. 
 
  Note that even after basic public goods are obtained, the maintenance of these goods 
will take priority over more advanced goods. For instance, a communal kitchen must first 
purchase a stove or find a donated stove, but then it must make repairs as the stove is used.  
The stoves I observed in different comedores populares were not industrial-sized stoves, but 
they were used five or six days a week to cook for a hundred or more people; it is not 
surprising that constant repairs were needed. Approximately 20% of the 184 cases studied 
involved maintenance of a previously obtained good. Examples of physical maintenance 
include repairs to stoves, communal buildings, and sewage lines; other actions were for 
maintenance of government subsidies, or to maintain occupation of an area. For this reason, 
basic goods will continue to take priority over luxury goods even as an area becomes more 
developed. 
 
In conclusion, observations showed that collective action could be used to get such 
basic goods as water lines, or to maintain occupation of a neighborhood. Collective action was 
much less likely to succeed when a “luxury” good, like a garden, was desired, because of the 
limited income of the residents. Collective action was also less likely to succeed when a good 
was particularly expensive, or when the action involved hidden costs (such as obtaining other 
goods first). 
 
  Observations also support the idea that exclusion is the third barrier to success in 
collective action.  Social and economic exclusion make collective action more costly and more 
risky for low income groups by limiting their access to information. This incomplete action 
may mean that a group does not know the necessary steps that must be taken to obtain a good.   
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Furthermore, if an organization believes that it will not be heard by a country’s leaders, it may 
decide not to invest its resources in an initiative it deems likely to fail.   
 
For instance, let us consider the case of the neighborhoods that believed the municipal 
tax rate was unfair, particularly in its use of fines and interest rates. At a rally for residents of 
those neighborhoods, comments could be heard such as “to them [the municipality], we don’t 
exist,” and “we’re marginalized.” Some residents felt that the municipal authorities would not 
listen to them, and at least one person remarked “we won’t get anywhere negotiating; this has 
to be done by force.” Residents were not the only ones to feel marginalized by politicians; a 
neighborhood president felt that municipal authorities were disconnected from the reality of 
poor areas: 
 
Unfortunately, the professionals, the politicians that come to power, in this case we’re 
talking about the municipality, okay? The mayors. They have their advisors; they have 
their working groups, in urban issues and in other areas.  And those people just get 
data and start creating projects… but unfortunately they’re not from the place [where 
they’re implementing the project], they don’t know the reality; so then they just limit 
themselves to the data they have and they that’s what they base their projects on. 
 
This belief was voiced by the president of a communal kitchen as well; she thought 
that policy makers would pay more attention to survey data than to the needs of the poor as 
voiced by the poor themselves. Other organizations were unaware of their legal rights and 
unable to afford a lawyer to represent them in things like land disputes. 
 
  Organizations appeared to distrust not only politicians but lawyers and non-
governmental organizations. Multiple groups expressed concern that not only was a lawyer 
expensive, but that they would not know whether the information they were being given was 
valid. One organization reported an unwillingness to work with Peruvian-run non-
governmental organizations because of a belief that the NGO would use them to obtain 
international aid contributions and then disappear without fulfilling their promises to the 
community. In summary, several of the organizations interviewed reported either a lack of 
access to information, a feeling of marginalization or exclusion, a distrust of authorities, a 
distrust of sources of information (like lawyers and NGOs), or a combination thereof. Some 




  Organizations did suggest ways this exclusion could be overcome to obtain public 
goods. One neighborhood did not have any water lines, but observed that an adjacent 
neighborhood had been able to obtain several communal water faucets with financial 
assistance from an NGO.
8 The first neighborhood presumed that the NGO could therefore be 
trusted, and they sought help from that organization.  Using funds from the NGO and manual 
labor from the community, communal water faucets were installed. Similarly, women from 
one neighborhood observed that nearby neighborhoods had government-subsidized communal 
kitchens, and they then successfully applied to the same government program so they could 
build a comedor popular. Thus organizations that could observe successful actions in nearby 
areas then knew what steps needed to be taken, so they could then replicate those actions. 
 
  Another method for bypassing a sense of exclusion or marginalization was using 
vertical social networks. In other words, a community leader with ties to governmental 
authorities could more easily obtain governmental aid for a communal project. When one 
community wanted electricity, the neighborhood president was able to establish connections 
with an electrical company through a family relative, an engineer. A Glass of Milk committee 
that needed a new stove was able to obtain a donated stove from a political party during an 
elections campaign, because one of the kitchen’s members was active in that party. Other 
neighborhoods reported an increase in donations during election years from political parties 
hoping to win votes. This does not point to a lower level of exclusion, but rather to a 
paternalistic political process in which the poor do not have an equal voice on an ongoing 
basis. Organizations that had vertical connections were able to avoid the exclusion problem by 
obtaining information from a reliable source and by being assured that the same source would 
help them meet their goals. They could trust the politician because they had a personal 
relationship. 
 
  The exclusion problem also predicts that collective action will occur at a community 
level, but that the exclusion problem will prevent initiatives on a greater scale. Organizations 
are able to win local goods, such as new sewage lines for their neighborhood, but not more 
“global” goods, like legislation to provide sewage lines for all shantytowns. A previous study 
in rural Peru has indicated similar results; Figueroa (2002) found no evidence of collective 
                                                 
8   These piletas were the second step in obtaining an adequate water supply.  The first step was to 
get the municipal water truck to drive through the neighborhood, selling water that was often 
heavily polluted.  The second step was to install communal faucets; the final step was to install 
pipes in each house.  Each step may take several years to accomplish.  
  34
action on a greater “global” scale (76-77). There was some evidence found in this study in 
urban Peru of successful greater actions, but they were very limited. Of the 184 collective 
initiatives used in the final data analysis, only six had intended beneficiaries outside the 
sponsoring organization or federation.
9 Four of these initiatives were related to lowering 
municipal taxes; those three organizations had been working together and with other 
organizations in a loose federation, but the potential benefits extended to other neighborhoods 
not in the federation. If they could win lower tax rates for their own neighborhoods, the lower 
rates would be applied to all neighborhoods in that district of Lima. Another of the initiatives 
was to clear an occupation of a major road; one shantytown had set up a new settlement on a 
major road adjacent to a different shantytown. This initiative benefited the adjacent 
neighborhoods by improving access to the road but also benefited the general public in Lima 
that used that road. Finally, one neighborhood association had joined other organizations to 
support a law that they believed favored shantytowns; according to them, the law benefited all 
shantytowns (not just those initiating the collective action). The negotiations over municipal 
taxes were successful, as was the road dispute, but the final case did not appear to be 
successful. In summary, these observations seem to suggest that exclusion or an inferior level 
of citizenship is a barrier and that low-income areas have incomplete information and a low 
lobbying capacity. This leads to an inability on the part of grassroots organizations to win 
broader government policies benefiting the poor. The example of a fight for political rights 
demonstrates how all three barriers can come into play: lobbying typically requires a large 
group (leading to the possibility of a free-rider problem), is expensive (and may not be 
considered as necessary for survival as a basic good like food or water), and it requires a level 
of political and social inclusion that the urban poor likely will not have. 
 
  In conclusion, the observations from site visits described above seem to add support to 
the theoretical arguments that there are several barriers to collective action in low-income 
communities. Free-riding behavior was found, but several strategies were used to overcome it.  
These included the use of coercion mechanisms (sanctions or incentives), greater monetary or 
time commitments from a group’s leaders, and the use of federated structures. In some cases, 
people seemed to change their behavior in favor of collective action, as in the case of shocks 
that threatened the survival of the group. Limited income proved restrictive, particularly as it 
                                                 
9   Note that there were many actions that benefited all the members of a federation, that is, not just 
the members of one organization. These were still considered localized, however, because 
benefits would not extend to the public outside of the federation.  The six “globalized” initiatives 
did indeed benefit the greater public.  
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determined the type and order of public goods obtained. Basic goods needed to be obtained 
and then maintained before advanced goods could be considered. Advanced goods were 
sometimes more costly than basic goods, decreasing even further the likelihood that they 
would be obtained. Social exclusion was a further barrier; groups reported a lack of access to 
information and distrust of authorities. These combined to make collective actions on a broad 
scale extremely infrequent. These observations provide some examples of how the three 
restrictive mechanisms may play out in a neighborhood’s attempts to obtain a public good.  
They should be taken as qualitative, first-hand evidence only. The relationships are further 
explored in the following section, using statistical analysis. 
 
5. QUANTITATIVE  RESULTS 
 
5.1 Measurement 
Again, the variables measured were: group size, coercion mechanisms, federation, 
homogeneity, presence of a shock, presence of development, monetary cost, time cost, basic 
good, advanced good, educational level of leaders, exclusion by geographic origin, and 
potential beneficiaries. 
 
For group size the relevant measurement is number of members, not the number of 
beneficiaries. For instance, in a comedor popular to which 22 women belong but which serves 
meals to an average of 110 people each day, the relevant quantity for group size is 22 since 
this is the number of people expected to carry out the group’s activities. 
 
Note that federation refers to the structure of each action, not to the general structure 
of the group. For instance, comedores populares have a federated organizational structure 
(Blondet and Montero, 1995, p. 131) because individual kitchens report back to umbrella 
organizations; the same is true for comites de Vaso de Leche. Yet their collective initiatives 
may or may not be the work of the entire federation; for demands against the government the 
umbrella organization typically mobilizes the individual kitchens, but an action such as 
replacing a stolen stove would happen solely at the level of the individual kitchens. For this 
study the first case is considered federated while the second is not. Similar classifications were 
made for other types of groups. 
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For the presence of development the relevant distinction is whether a collective action 
was being undertaken to either obtain a new public good or maintain a previously won public 
good. The maintenance of a good can be further subdivided into two categories. Goods could 
require maintenance because of typical capital stock depreciation, or because an exogenous 
shock threatened the good.  For instance, if a community that had never had sewage lines was 
trying to obtain them, that initiative would be considered “development.” If a community 
needed work done on cracked or antiquated sewage lines, then the action is considered 
“maintenance.” If a flood destroyed part of a sewage system, which then needed replacing, the 
action is considered a “response to a shock.” Note that the nature of the shocks observed will 
depend on whether the study takes places in a rural context (in which environmental shocks 
such as floods will be more common) or an urban context (in which political or legal shocks 
such as a neighboring shantytown threatening to invade a community’s land will be more 
common).  
 
Three problems arose during collective action data collection: selection bias, 
measurement bias and multicollinearity. The selection bias likely favored successful 
initiatives; collective actions that were never begun could be considered failures (in the sense 
that the corresponding public good was never obtained), but such instances are not represented 
in this data set. It should be noted that where a collective initiative had failed, variables such 
as cost were measured by what the informants believed they would have needed to invest for 
the action to be successful, not what they in reality where able to invest. Similarly, a strong 
measurement bias favored actions where potential beneficiaries included only the members the 
organization. As Figueroa’s (2002) rural study found (see section 2), actions outside a 
community were almost nonexistent. Actions that had never been attempted outside a 
community (though the public good may have been desired) are conceptually considered 
failures, but they are absent from the dataset.  Thus this variable was dropped. 
 
The measurement bias arose in such variables as exclusion; exclusion is generally a 
difficult variable to measure, in that it can refer to political, cultural or economic processes (or 
a combination thereof) (Figueroa, 1999, pp. 2-3). Ruggeri Laderchi, Saith and Stewart (2003) 
document the wide range of measurements used in economic development studies (pp. 22-23).  
The appropriate measurement must always be determined within the context of the 
communities studied. For this study, indices were built to represent educational and 
geographic exclusion of community members. The data was collected, however, from  
  37
informant interviews, not from a community-wide survey and thus may suffer from 
measurement bias. Educational level of leaders was also problematic as a proxy for exclusion 
because it gave an indication of quantitative exclusion but not qualitative exclusion; inequality 
in the quality of instruction was not measured, yet presumably there would be differences 
between the quality of a school in a poor area and the quality of a school in a wealthy 
neighborhood.   
 
Measurement bias may be present for the coercion mechanisms variable; data was 
only collected on explicit coercion mechanisms (like fines or warnings), because of the 
difficulties associated with identifying implicit mechanisms (like shunning). Measurement 
bias may also be present in for the two costs variables.  It became clear that accurate measures 
for costs and participants would only be possible within the period that the informant had been 
a group leader. Yet some actions stretched across several periods, or were temporarily 
abandoned and then renewed when a new set of leaders entered the organization. Thus a 
binary variable renewed was introduced to show whether an action had been renewed when 
new group leaders entered.  It was hypothesized that renewed actions would lead to a higher 
degree of failure, because for such cases the costs reported were much lower than the total 
cost. 
 
Finally, as the analysis below shows, a high number of explanatory variables were 
correlated with one another.  In future studies, a larger data set may alleviate this problem.   
 
5.2 Descriptive  Statistics 
All variable descriptions are listed in Table A.1 (in Appendix A) and descriptive 
statistics are given in Table A.2. After removing observations with incomplete data, a total of 
121 observations remained, of which 96 (79%) were classified as successes and 25 (21%) as 
failures. 
  
5.3 T-tests  and  χ
2 tests for exogenous variables over endogenous variable 
A variance ratio test was first used to test the hypothesis that the variables had equal 
variance for collective action successes and failures. The hypothesis was rejected for group 
size, monetary cost and time cost (see Table B.1 in Appendix B). Next the two-tailed t-test 
was used to test hypotheses that variable means (for group size, heterogeneity, monetary cost, 
time cost, and geographic exclusion) are the same between collective action successes and  
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failures. The test assumed equal variance for heterogeneity and geographic exclusion, but not 















Group size  233.9  186.7  No  No 
Heterogeneity 25.1  22.1  No  No 
Monetary cost  0.024  0.665  Yes  No 
Time cost  1.29  2.98  Yes  No 
Geographic exclusion  54.5  48.4  No  No 
 
The null hypothesis was not rejected for any of the variables (see Table B.2). 
 
 The  χ
2 test was used to test hypotheses that variable proportions are the same for the 
categorical data over the endogenous variable. The null hypothesis was rejected for multiple 
attempts and advanced good. The null hypothesis was not rejected for coercion mechanisms, 
federation, shock, development, basic good, or educational level, as Table 3 shows (for full 





Variable Hypothesis  Pr  Result  of  χ
2 test 
Coercion  Variable proportions are the same  0.909  Not rejected 
Federation  Variable proportions are the same  0.066  Not rejected 
Shock  Variable proportions are the same  0.485  Not rejected 
Development  Variable proportions are the same  0.117  Not rejected 
Multiple attempts  Variable proportions are the same  0.007  Rejected 
Basic good  Variable proportions are the same  0.129  Not rejected 
Advanced good  Variable proportions are the same  0.001  Rejected 
Educational level  Variable proportions are the same  0.237  Not rejected 
 
 
5.4 T-tests  and  χ
2 tests for pairs of exogenous variables 
  In this section tests were run on pairs of exogenous variables to look for relationships 
between these variables. The two-tailed t-test, the χ
2 test, and piecewise correlations were 
used, and twenty-nine pairs were found to have statistically significant relationships. The two-
tailed t-test was used to test hypotheses that means are the same between different categories 
of the categorical data (after using a variance ratio test). The null hypothesis was rejected for  
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10 of 35 pairs of explanatory variables (pairs are listed below in Table 4; the full tests are 




Pairs of explanatory variables for which the null hypothesis that variable 
means are the same was rejected 
 
Heterogeneity Multiple  attempts 
Heterogeneity Coercion  mechanisms 
Geographic exclusion  Coercion mechanisms 
Group size  Coercion mechanisms 
Time cost  Coercion mechanisms 
Group size  Basic good 
Time cost  Basic good 
Geographic exclusion  Advanced good 
Group size  Advanced good 
Time cost  Federation 
 
 
 The  χ
2 test was used to test hypotheses that variable proportions are the same between 
different categories of the categorical data; the null hypothesis was rejected for 15 of 28 pairs 
of explanatory variables (pairs are listed below in Table 5; the full tests are given in Table 
C.2).   
 
Table 5 
Pairs of explanatory variables for which the null hypothesis 
that variable proportions are the same was rejected 
 
Coercion mechanisms  Educational level 
Federation Shock 
Federation Development 
Federation Basic  good 
Federation Advanced  good 
Federation Educational  level 
Shock Development 
Shock Basic  good 
Shock Advanced  good 
Shock Educational  level 
Development Basic  good 
Development Advanced  good 
Development Educational  level 
Basic good  Advanced good 
Advanced good  Educational level 
 
  Finally, piecewise correlations were used for interval explanatory variables, and three 
pairs were found to be correlated (pairs are listed below in Table 6; the correlations are given 




Pairs of explanatory variables with significant correlations 
 
Heterogeneity Group  size 
Time cost  Group size 
Geographic exclusion  Group size 
Geographic exclusion  Heterogeneity 
 
 
5.5  The logit model 
  The model chosen was a regressive logit model with binary outcomes. Various logit 
models were tested using different combinations of the thirteen explanatory variables. Models 
with P-values greater than 0.05 (using the Hosmer-Lemeshow χ
2-statistic) were dropped, as 
were the models with the highest Akaike Information Criteria (AIC) (see Table D.1 in 
Appendix D). 
 
The model that included the variables heterogeneity, group size, cost in time, and the 
dummy variable for advanced goods provided the best fit. The final model chosen, as Table 7 
shows, was  
 







Log likelihood =  -52.010442 
Number of  obs     =        121 
LR chi2 (4)     =     19.26 
Prob > chi2     =   0.0007 
Pseudo R2    =   0.1562 
 
coll_act |  Coef.  Std. Err.  z  P>|z|  [95% Conf. Interval] 
hete |  .0374608  .0267483  1.40  0.161  -.0149648  .0898865 
grou_size  |  .0021075 .0010198  2.07  0.039 .0001088 .0041062 
time_cost  |  -.1034391  .0497003  -2.08  0.037 -.2008499 -.0060284 
adva_good  |  -1.915528  .5494585  -3.49  0.000 -2.992447 -.8386088 
_cons |  .882833  .7169153  1.23  0.218  -.5222951  2.287961 
 
 
As Table 7 shows, the best regression model chosen stated that collective action is a 
function of group size, heterogeneity, time cost, and the Maslowian level of the good sought: 
group size had a statistically significant positive effect, time cost had a statistically significant 
negative effect, and the Maslowian level (advanced) had a statistically significant negative 




The principal question this paper aimed to address was how poor urban communities 
produce and maintain public goods. Theoretical issues were first explored, such as the 
Olsonian free-rider problem, pointing also to factors that may mitigate the effect of this 
problem.  In general individuals will tend to opt not to contribute to collective causes because 
of the individual costs involved, but this will occur less frequently in small groups, in 
federated groups, in homogenous groups, where individual incentives or sanctions are 
imposed, and where shocks encourage altruistic behavior. The Maslowian problem was also 
considered; poor communities will be restricted in their ability to produce public goods by 
their resource endowments whenever the desired public goods do not satisfy primary 
necessities. Finally the role of exclusion was analyzed; exclusion can hinder the ability of poor 
communities to complete collective actions by hampering access to information and to 
political participation. Exclusion was also theorized to play a role by constricting the 
beneficiaries of any particular action to the group conducting the action, thus limiting the 
ability of poor communities to fight for more global goods such as political rights.   
Preliminary evidence was given from past researchers in support of these three barriers. 
 
  Next an economic model was constructed for public goods production based on the 
given theoretical framework. This model proposed that collective action is a function of group 
size, the existence of coercion mechanisms, the existence of a federated structure, the group’s 
degree of homogeneity, the presence of a shock, the presence of an attempt at development, 
the monetary cost of the good, the time cost of the good, the Maslowian level of the good 
(basic or advanced), the educational level of the group leaders, the geographic origin of the 
group members (rural areas versus the capital city), and the potential beneficiaries of the 
action (the last three being measurements of exclusion). It was hypothesized that larger 
groups, higher monetary costs, higher time costs, higher degrees of heterogeneity, rural 
geographic origins, potential beneficiaries from outside the group, attempts at new 
development, and attempts at advanced goods would all have a negative effect on collective 
action, whereas the presence of coercion mechanisms, a federated structure, higher 
educational levels, the presence of a shock, and attempts at basic goods would all have a 
positive effect on collective action. 
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  Empirical evidence was shown from Lima, Peru; community leaders in various 
shantytowns were interviewed. Direct observations from the fieldwork were recorded and 
presented. This qualitative set of data provided preliminary consistency with the predictions of 
the theories. The qualitative information presented is not intended to test the model, rather to 
show how the model might play out in poor urban communities. For the quantitative analysis, 
each of 22 groups gave information on approximately 10 collective actions, resulting in a 
sample size of 121. Some variables had to be dropped because of measurement problems 
including selection bias, measurement bias, and multicollinearity. After various logit 
regression models were tried, the best regression model was chosen. While the statistical 
results did not offer strong evidence either for or against the model, it is important to 
remember that they represented a first attempt at a quantitative analysis. Data collection 
proved particularly challenging, which resulted in some measurement error. It is the author’s 
hope that future investigations will be able to make use of the model and expand on the 
quantitative analysis. 
 
  In the study of economic development in poorer countries, the question will inevitably 
arise of who has the power and the will to create opportunities for economic development. It is 
important to recognize to what extent poor communities are able to create their own collective 
initiatives, and to what extent they are limited by economic barriers. Only then can we 
formulate realistic expectations for organic, locally initiated, economic development. By 
understanding how collective action can work for public goods provision, we will be better 
able to plan social policy and aid programs. A particularly important result given in the 
qualitative section was the way in which all three economic barriers will work to prevent 
grassroots organizations from inciting broader economic or political change. While it may be 
possible for small community groups to build water lines, to obtain stoves for communal 
kitchens, etc, farther-reaching changes will prove to be limited when poor urban areas are left 









Description of variables 
 
variable name  variable label 
coll_act  collective action success 
grou_size group  size 





mone_cost monetary  cost 
time_cost time  cost 
mult_att multiple  attempts 
basi_good basic  good 
adva_good advanced  good 
educ_leve educational  level 







Variable N  sum  mean  sd  min  max  median 
BINARY VARIABLES 
coll_act |  121  96           
coer_mech |  121  35           
fede |  121  32           
shoc |  121  51           
deve |  121  42           
mult_att |  121  9           
basi_good |  121  55           
adva_good |  121  31           
ORDERED VARIABLES 
educ_leve  | 121   3.752066  1.27985  2  6  4 
NOMINAL VARIABLES 
grou_size  | 121   224.1818  314.5085  15  1175   
hete  |  121    24.47394  9.776323 12.37696 37.42326  
mone_cost  | 121   .1568467  1.113924  0  11.62506   
time_cost  | 121   1.640598  4.411165  0  26.28   





2 test over endogeneous variable 
 
Table B.1 
Variance ratio tests 
 
Group size by Collective action 
  P < F_obs = 0.0137     P < F_L + P > F_U = 0.0170     P > F_obs = 0.9863 
 
Heterogeneity by Collective action 
  P < F_obs = 0.1734     P < F_L + P > F_U = 0.3008     P > F_obs = 0.8266 
 
Monetary cost by Collective action 
  P < F_obs = 1.0000     P < F_L + P > F_U = 0.0000     P > F_obs = 0.0000 
 
Time cost by Collective action 
  P < F_obs = 0.9862     P < F_L + P > F_U = 0.0483     P > F_obs = 0.0138 
 
Geographic exclusion by Collective Action 




Two-tailed t-test on variable means for collective action success and failures 
 
Group size by Collective action 
   P < t =   0.2027          P > |t| =   0.4055          P > t =   0.7973 
 
Group size by Collective action 
   P < t =   0.0889          P > |t| =   0.1779          P > t =   0.9111 
 
Monetary cost by Collective Action 
   P < t =   0.9017          P > |t| =   0.1966          P > t =   0.0983 
 
Time cost by Collective action 
   P < t =   0.9178          P > |t| =   0.1644          P > t =   0.0822 
 
Geographic exclusion by Collective action 






2 test on variable proportions for collective action successes and failures 
 
Coercion mechanisms by Collective action 
          Pearson chi2(1) =   0.0131   Pr = 0.909 
 
Federation by Collective action 
          Pearson chi2(1) =   3.3806   Pr = 0.066 
 
Shock by Collective action 
          Pearson chi2(1) =   0.4886   Pr = 0.485 
 
Development by collective action 
          Pearson chi2(1) =   2.4556   Pr = 0.117 
 
Multiple attempts by collective action 
          Pearson chi2(1) =   7.2224   Pr = 0.007 
 
Basic good by collective action 
          Pearson chi2(1) =   2.3007   Pr = 0.129 
 
Advanced good by collective action 
          Pearson chi2(1) =  11.5074   Pr = 0.001 
 
Educational level of leaders by collective action 





2 test over explanatory variables 
 
Table C.1 
Two-tailed t-test on variable means for explanatory variables 
 
Heterogeneity by Multiple attempts 
   P < t =   1.0000          P > |t| =   0.0000          P > t =   0.0000 
 
Geographic exclusion by Multiple attempts 
   P < t =   0.9082          P > |t| =   0.1836          P > t =   0.0918 
 
Group size by Multiple attempts 
   P < t =   0.0763          P > |t| =   0.1526          P > t =   0.9237 
 
Monetary cost by Multiple attempts 
   P < t =   0.1606          P > |t| =   0.3211          P > t =   0.8394 
 
Time cost by Multiple attempts 
   P < t =   0.0724          P > |t| =   0.1449          P > t =   0.9276 
 
Heterogeneity by Coercion mechanisms 
   P < t =   0.0000          P > |t| =   0.0000          P > t =   1.0000 
 
Geographic exclusion by Coercion mechanisms 
   P < t =   0.0090          P > |t| =   0.0179          P > t =   0.9910 
 
Group size by Coercion mechanisms 
   P < t =   0.9991          P > |t| =   0.0017          P > t =   0.0009 
 
Monetary cost by Coercion mechanisms 
   P < t =   0.1849          P > |t| =   0.3698          P > t =   0.8151 
 
Time cost by Coercion mechanisms 
   P < t =   0.9996          P > |t| =   0.0008          P > t =   0.0004 
 
Heterogeneity by Basic good 
   P < t =   0.0865          P > |t| =   0.1731          P > t =   0.9135 
 
Geographic exclusion by Basic good 
   P < t =   0.0371          P > |t| =   0.0743          P > t =   0.9629 
 
Group size by Basic good 
   P < t =   1.0000          P > |t| =   0.0000          P > t =   0.0000 
 
Monetary cost by Basic good 
   P < t =   0.9057          P > |t| =   0.1885          P > t =   0.0943 
 
Time cost by Basic good 
   P < t =   0.9971          P > |t| =   0.0058          P > t =   0.0029 
 
Heterogeneity by Advanced good 
   P < t =   0.9454          P > |t| =   0.1092          P > t =   0.0546 
 
Geographic exclusion by Advanced good 
   P < t =   0.9962          P > |t| =   0.0076          P > t =   0.0038  
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Group size by Advanced good 
   P < t =   0.0035          P > |t| =   0.0069          P > t =   0.9965 
 
Monetary cost by Advanced good 
   P < t =   0.1887          P > |t| =   0.3775          P > t =   0.8113 
 
Time cost by Advanced good 
   P < t =   0.3656          P > |t| =   0.7312          P > t =   0.6344 
 
Heterogeneity by Shock 
   P < t =   0.1170          P > |t| =   0.2340          P > t =   0.8830 
 
Geographic exclusion by Shock 
   P < t =   0.0430          P > |t| =   0.0859          P > t =   0.9570 
 
Group size by Shock 
   P < t =   0.9395          P > |t| =   0.1211          P > t =   0.0605 
 
Monetary cost by Shock 
   P < t =   0.6984          P > |t| =   0.6033          P > t =   0.3016 
 
Time cost by shock 
   P < t =   0.9295          P > |t| =   0.1410          P > t =   0.0705 
 
Heterogeneity by Development 
   P < t =   0.2959          P > |t| =   0.5917          P > t =   0.7041 
 
Geographic exclusion by Development 
   P < t =   0.3309          P > |t| =   0.6617          P > t =   0.6691 
 
Group size by Development 
   P < t =   0.3128          P > |t| =   0.6256          P > t =   0.6872 
 
Monetary cost by Development 
   P < t =   0.1877          P > |t| =   0.3754          P > t =   0.8123 
 
Time cost by Development 
   P < t =   0.0513          P > |t| =   0.1027          P > t =   0.9487 
 
Heterogeneity by Federation 
   P < t =   0.9207          P > |t| =   0.1586          P > t =   0.0793 
 
Geographic exclusion by Federation 
   P < t =   0.6864          P > |t| =   0.6271          P > t =   0.3136 
 
Group size by Federation 
   P < t =   0.9190          P > |t| =   0.1620          P > t =   0.0810 
 
Monetary cost by Federation 
   P < t =   0.9210          P > |t| =   0.1579          P > t =   0.0790 
 
Time cost by Federation 






2 test on variable proportions over explanatory variables 
 
Coercion mechanisms by Federation 
          Pearson chi2(1) =   0.6284   Pr = 0.428 
 
Coercion mechanisms by Shock 
          Pearson chi2(1) =   0.8331   Pr = 0.361 
 
Coercion mechanisms by Development 
          Pearson chi2(1) =   0.1285   Pr = 0.720 
 
Coercion mechanisms by Multiple attempts 
          Pearson chi2(1) =   1.5009   Pr = 0.221 
 
Coercion mechanisms by Basic good 
          Pearson chi2(1) =   0.7088   Pr = 0.400 
 
Coercion mechanisms by Advanced good 
          Pearson chi2(1) =   0.8161   Pr = 0.366 
 
Coercion mechanisms by Educational level 
          Pearson chi2(4) =  17.0973   Pr = 0.002 
 
Federation by Shock 
          Pearson chi2(1) =  23.0929   Pr = 0.000 
 
Federation by Development 
          Pearson chi2(1) =   9.4703   Pr = 0.002 
 
Federation by Multiple attempts 
          Pearson chi2(1) =   0.2371   Pr = 0.626 
 
Federation by Basic good 
          Pearson chi2(1) =   5.0983   Pr = 0.024 
 
Federation by Advanced good 
          Pearson chi2(1) =  11.5525   Pr = 0.001 
 
Federation by Educational level 
          Pearson chi2(4) =  10.4390   Pr = 0.034 
 
Shock by Development 
          Pearson chi2(1) =  46.8684   Pr = 0.000 
 
Shock by Multiple attempts 
          Pearson chi2(1) =   0.7167   Pr = 0.397 
 
Shock by Basic good 
          Pearson chi2(1) =  10.6301   Pr = 0.001 
 
Shock by Advanced good 
          Pearson chi2(1) =  14.6193   Pr = 0.000 
 
Shock by Educational level 
          Pearson chi2(4) =  21.2279   Pr = 0.000 
 
Development by Multiple attempts 
          Pearson chi2(1) =   0.0081   Pr = 0.928  
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Development by Basic good 
          Pearson chi2(1) =   5.4568   Pr = 0.019 
 
Development by Advanced good 
          Pearson chi2(1) =  16.3376   Pr = 0.000 
 
Development by Educational level 
          Pearson chi2(4) =  12.1673   Pr = 0.016 
 
Multiple attempts by Basic good 
          Pearson chi2(1) =   2.1167   Pr = 0.146 
 
Multiple attempts by Advanced good 
          Pearson chi2(1) =   0.0589   Pr = 0.808 
 
Multiple attempts by Educational level 
          Pearson chi2(4) =   2.4412   Pr = 0.655 
 
Basic good by Advanced good 
          Pearson chi2(1) =  34.7315   Pr = 0.000 
 
Basic good by Educational level 
          Pearson chi2(4) =  29.4644   Pr = 0.000 
 
Advanced good by Educational level 






Piecewise correlations of explanatory variables 
 
 grou_s~e  hete mone_c~t  time_c~t  geog_e~l 
grou_size |  1.0000    
hete |  -0.2655*  1.0000  
mone_cost   -0.0184  -0.1392 1.0000  
time_cost |  0.2179*  -0.0320 0.0583 1.0000 












Hete, grou, time, adva  23.12  0.0032  114.02 
Hete, geog, grou, time, adva  19.82  0.0110  115.94 
Hete, shoc, grou, fede, mone, time  19.89  0.0108  122.85 
Hete, shoc, grou, fede, time, adva  15.53  0.0496  115.36 












Asentamiento humano (“human settlement”): Also known as pueblo joven or barriada, 
these shantytown settlements represent a large, and growing, portion of Lima’s landscape.  
Entire districts to the north, east, and south of downtown Lima are made up of shantytowns.  
Left mostly to their own devices for such services as running water, sewage, and electricity, 
the settlements range in size and degree of poverty. Most eventually obtain all basic services, 
even cable television and internet, but with little or no technical planning. 
 
Asociación de Padres de Familia / APAFA (“Parents’ Association”): An organization for 
the parents of children; it functions at the level of the school but is eligible to receive 
consulting assistance from the government. Revenue comes from a subscription fee (waived 
for those in extreme poverty), fundraisers, or a concession stand on school grounds. At most 
public schools, the APAFA is responsible for maintenance of the school grounds and other 
school expenses. 
 
Asociación de pobladores (“association of settlers”): A neighborhood organization, typically 
begun when a settlement is first invaded. The initial purpose is to organize settlers to prevent 
intimidation and/or removal by police forces or other groups of settlers. Later it serves to 
organize neighborhood inhabitants for communal projects. Led by a president and other 
directors, called dirigentes.  Typically each home-owner receives one vote (excluding renters).  
Revenue may come from a membership fee, fundraisers, government or NGO donations, or 
from the dirigentes’ personal funds. 
 
Comedor popular (“popular kitchen”): A group of approximately 20 to 30 women who cook 
low-cost lunches (lunch is the main meal of the day in Lima). Two or three women cook each 
day, and they receive lunches for themselves and their family for free. Lunches are sold to 
community members (at the time of this writing, for $0.30 to $0.50) and given at no cost to 
disabled people and those in extreme poverty. Basic ingredients are donated by the 
government; fuel and other ingredients are paid for from the revenue that fundraisers and the 
sale of lunches bring in, or from monetary contributions from the members. The comedor may 
operate out of a member’s home, or the group may rent a space from neighbors or the local 
asociación de pobladores. 
 
Comité de Vaso de Leche (Glass of Milk committee): A committee of women who prepare 
low-cost breakfasts for neighborhood children. Breakfast usually consists of oatmeal or other 
breakfast cereals (not literally milk).  Ingredients are donated by the government. Fuel is paid 
for from the revenue the breakfasts and fundraisers bring in. 
 
Cooperativa de mercado (“market cooperative): An organization of vendors at a market.  
May hold fundraisers or require membership fees to maintain the infrastructure of the market. 
 
Dirigente: President or other leader of a community organization, elected by the 
organization’s members. 
 
Invasión (“invasion”):  The initial occupation of a shantytown.  It frequently occurs overnight 
and is organized in advance.  They typically occur as informal, illegal invasions of unused 
land; in some cases tens of thousands of people have settled a single area in a single night 
(although some settlements, notably Villa El Salvador, have been organized and supported by  
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the government). Land that may be targeted includes unused or underused state or agricultural 
lands in the deserts surrounding Lima, over a garbage dump, next to a railroad, or on the 
unstable banks of a river. Settlers bring straw mats (esteras) and blankets to set up their 
temporary homes. The invasión can lead to violence, as the settlers defend their land against 
other settlers or against the police. 
 
Mesa de Concertación: Anti-poverty forums, designed to bring together representatives from 
the government, NGOs and other charitable organizations, hospitals and clinics, schools, 
churches, and community organizations to plan projects to reduce poverty in shantytowns.  
Sometimes criticized by other organizations for inefficiency and an inability to accomplish 
concrete projects. 
 
Pollada: Fundraiser used by many community organizations to pay for communal projects. A 
pollada is a chicken dinner, prepared by the organization and sold to community members.  
Similar fundraisers include anticuchadas, cevichadas, and picaronadas (all selling different 
Peruvian foods). Also used by private families to pay for extraordinary expenses such as 
medical bills. 
 
Reciclaje (“recycling”): The term used to describe the scavenging, recycling and reusing of 
solid waste material.  The informal workers who engage in this activity are known in Peru as 
recicladores and recaladores (in other countries as pepenadores or cartoneros). They collect 
metal, plastic, rubber, paper, electronics, and other discarded goods, sort them, and sell them 
to middlemen, who in turn sell the waste to recycling companies.  The job is hazardous to the 
workers’ health, and can lead to harassment from municipal authorities, yet the workers 
represent a complex, growing informal sector in many developing countries.  Lima’s 
recicladores frequently use triciclos: carts attached to tricycles to collect goods. 
 
Vivencia: The term used by one organization interviewed to describe the occupation 
requirements when a neighborhood was first invaded. All settlers were required to have 
someone occupy their home 24 hours a day. Failure to do so could result in community leaders 
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